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Abstract 
Secured Position Location and Tracking (PL&T) scheme is 
developed for multiple malicious radios or nodes detection using 
integrated key based strict friendly scheme and position location 
and tracking by multi-sectored based multiple target’s PL&T. 
The friendly and malicious nodes detection is based on the 
integrated key consisting of symmetric keys, geographic location 
and round trip response time. Two strictly friend references 
dynamically form the tracking zone over the detected multiple 
malicious nodes using the multi-sectored adaptive beam forming. 
This PL&T technique is robust, precise, scalable, and faster than 
using the single reference, two reference and three reference 
nodes based PL&T method in the battlefield oriented Mobile Ad 
hoc Networks. The simulation results show that the lower 
relative speed bound of any participating node increased the 
switching overhead, the decreasing received energy with 
increasing number of the multi-sectored beams reduced tracking 
accuracy and the strict friendly authentication overhead depends 
upon the time period between two latest periodic authentication 
failures. 
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1. Introduction 
The future generation of the digitized battlefield MANET 
and sensor networks provide robust, high-speed, 
contention free network architecture and overcome the line 
of sight limitation as well as jamming threats.  It also 
needs to do secured Position Location and Tracking 
(PL&T) of the friendly radios or nodes protecting from the 
hostile nodes, and preventing the hostile nodes from 
accessing the secured end-to-end paths. This is executed 
by maintaining secured multi-hop connection with strict 
friendly nodes which deploy the integrated approach of 
friendly authentication, the use of novel PL&T method and 
encryption of PL&T information. The PL&T of hostile 
node is also computed and multi-casted to friendly nodes, 
till the hostile node participated in PL&T.   
 
The proposed secured PL&T approach includes the 
friendly and malicious nodes detection by the strict 
friendly verification and the location tracking by zone 
forming, adaptive beam forming and triangulation. The  
 
multiple malicious targets’ PL&T is developed using the 
multiple adaptive beam forming over the rapidly predicted 
multiple zones which dynamically allow tracking for 
random trajectory as well as increase the tracking 
accuracy. The beam energy is concentrated towards the 
malicious target while moving farther using dynamic 
ranging. In addition, triangulation using two references 
dynamically allows changing references rather than the 
initialization of triangulation using three references. Thus, 
PL&T accuracy is significantly increased for multiple 
targets tracking even under multipath fading as compared 
to the existing PL&T using Omni-directional antennas.       
 
The strictly friend reference nodes participate in PL&T, as 
soon as malicious nodes are detected, by developing 
dynamic tracking zone over the malicious nodes using the 
ratio of the distance between reference nodes and the 
average distance of target from reference nodes. The 
coverage of tracking zone is focused by sectored beams of 
two reference nodes until it goes outside the zone and later 
the zone is updated by using available sectored beams of 
reference nodes depending upon the target’s direction of 
motion. The zone forming is rapidly iterated for multiple 
target’s PL&T by the spatial reuse of multi-sectored 
adaptive beam forming. 
2. Related Work  
Movement Tracking System (MTS) is a critical battlefield 
navigator for combat service support by connecting mobile 
radio system mounted on tactical wheeled vehicle to 
control station at headquarters to provide PL&T 
information and route information about the mission to 
other soldier’s radios. It consists of digital national 
geospatial-intelligence agency maps, global positioning 
system (GPS) location data, and L-band satellite two-way 
text messaging.  MTS+ is advanced systems which has an 
embedded military GPS card and embedded radio 
frequency identification (RFID) interrogator within the 
new L-band satellite transceiver. MTS–II software 
enhancements provide better location tracking, flexible 
messaging and better command and control. Similarly, 
Blue Force Tracking (BFT) is the GPS-enabled system 
that provides military commanders with location 
 information about friendly and hostile military forces on 
the computer's terrain-map display. The above mentioned 
movement’s location tracking systems are governed by the 
situation awareness room to provide PL&T information in 
the graphical display and command control. However, 
these are not capable to detect malicious or hostile radios 
by radio detection and immediately multicast towards 
other friendly radios for tracking and alert from hostile 
threat in the distributed networks. In addition, there is risk 
as many countries have capability to jam and destroy 
satellite systems. GPS also does not work near or inside 
the building or metallic structure. This can be addressed by 
the integrated zone finding and triangulation over 
malicious or hostile radio deploying two friendly radios 
equipped with smart antennas and location is mapped [1-
5]. The malicious and friendly radios are detected based on 
the encrypted anonymous private location assets [7-8]. 
 
Position Location and Tracking deploy different method 
for range measurement such as Angle of Arrival (AoA), 
Received Signal Strength (RSS), Time of Arrival (ToA), 
Time Difference of Arrival (TDoA) [1-5], [7].The location 
prediction based on these ranging method using one or two 
radios with directional antennas for estimation of the 
location of the target radio claims that it achieves better 
tracking accuracy over the triangulation based on using 
omni-directional antennas [1-3]. However, this technique 
has drawback of the lack of zone finding and increased 
accumulated errors in the computation of distance and the 
angle. In addition, the range measurements are not 
accurate in multipath faded channel due to uncorrelated 
signals, which is typically the case in the indoor tracking 
applications. These issues are addressed by the position 
location and tacking using the average of Time of Arrival 
(ToA) and Time of Departure (ToD) of the Internet 
Protocol (IP) based management packets in zone finding 
adaptive beam forming and triangulation. 
 
In this paper, we propose robust strict friendly verification 
scheme for friendly and malicious nodes detection and the 
multiple malicious targets’ PL&T scheme using MIMO 
antennas to concentrate the multiple beam forming over 
the predicted multiple tracking zones. The tracking zones 
are developed considering the current locations of two 
references as well as target, and the direction of movement 
within the battlefield mobility characteristics.  The size of 
zone defines the adaptive beam width over zone to 
improve the performance under multi-path fading and 
improve the tracking accuracy by creating optimal 
multiple beams for triangulation in PL&T tracking based 
on ToD and ToA information. It also has the advantage of 
only using two references instead of three references for 
2D PL&T and allows dynamic switching of reference 
nodes to maintain friendliness. Multiple nodes can be 
tracked by dynamically switching sectored beams between 
existing two or other friendly references. 
 
3. Strict Friendly Verification (SFV) Scheme 
 
Neighboring reference nodes are essential to verify them 
legitimately as strictly friends so that they can co-operate 
in the secured location tracking through multi-hop 
communications. The novel integrated key approach for 
packets encryption and decryption intending the strict 
friendliness verification deploy 256 bits length integrated 
key, which accomplish the minimal key lengths for 
symmetric ciphers to provide adequate commercial 
security. Initially, cluster head pre-initialize random 
number generator functions and symmetric keys. The 
novel integrated key is generated as 256 bits key K= (K1 
K2 K3) consisting 96 bits key (K1), 64 bits key (K2) and 96 
bits key (K3) to encrypt the packet by cluster head (CH).  
K1 is pseudo random number using initial seed (i-1) in the 
RNG1 function,   K2 is 64 bits secret symmetric key or 
identity IDTx of a node and   K3 is generated by the 
encryption of the first packet with the random number 
generated from RNG2 function using initial seed (n-1). 
Furthermore, the initial seed (i-1) for K1, is the location 
information (distance and direction) between CH and 
receiver whereas the initial seed (n-1) for K2, is the RTT of 
preamble packet between them. Then, first ensemble 
packet is encrypted using the first key K generated from 
the integration of the location information, RTT and 
symmetric key or ID.  Similarly,  the  second key K´= (K´1 
║K´2 ║ K´3) is the integration of K´1, generated from 
RNG1 function using first halve of key K as seed i, K´2  
same as K2 (symmetric key) and K´3, generated from RNG2 
function using second halve of key K as seed n. Then, the 
second ensemble packet is encrypted using second key K´ 
and this encryption procedure is iterated for next packets. 
The cipher packets Cj for j
th 
number of plain ensemble    
packets     are    computed    using   key kj in encryption as 
shown in Figure 1 using the equations 1 - 5.      
      
                          1 1K =RNG (seed )   i i      (1)
  2K =IDi Tx                      (2)
  3 2 1K ={ RNG (seed ) P }    i n i     (3)      
 
               1 2 3K ={K K K }   i i i i║ ║            (4)
               C =P K i i i       (5) 
 
At the receiver end, the first packet is decrypted by using 
key K= (K1║K2║K3) where, K1 is the 96 bits key 
generated using initial seed (i-1) which is the location 
information between transmitter and receiver in RNG1, K2 
is the 64 bits symmetric key of node and   K3 is 96 bits key 
 generated by the decryption of the first encrypted packets 
with the random number generated from RNG2 function 
using the initial seed (n-1) which is the RTT between 
transmitter and receiver. Regarding second packet, the 
decryption is done by changing K´1 and K´3 generated by 
RNG functions with new seeds achieved after halving the 
previous key and this decryption procedure is iterated for 
next packets. The plain ensemble packets Pj for j
th
 number 
of cipher packets are computed using keys kj in decryption 
as shown in Figure 2 using the following equations 6 - 10.  
                         
                       1 1K =RNG (seed )  j i       (6) 
                       2K =ID   j Rx                      (7) 
                      3 2 1 K ={ RNG (seed ) C } j n j
                   (8)   
                    
                       1 2 3K ={K K K } j j j j║ ║                                 (9)                 
                      P ={D (C )}=C K   j kj j j j
                      
(10) 
 
The receiver is declared as a strict friendly neighbor node, 
when each encrypted packets from CH are successfully 
decrypted by the receiver and validated by CH which can 
be used for direct or multi hop communication. If not, the 
node is deemed as a malicious node and is not authorized 
for payload data communications. This process of strict 
friendliness verification between neighbors is required 
each time for secure path connectivity for information 
exchange. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Packet Encryption for Strict Friendly Verification 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Packet Decryption for Strict Friendly Verification 
 
Regarding the symmetric cipher, higher keys length 
protect against brute force attacks. Increasing each bit in 
the key increases twice the number of possible keys and 
yields two times more search for the brute force attack. 
With 256-bits key, the complexity analysis of algorithm 
needs O (2
256
) = 1.15792089 × 10
77 
runs for the brutal 
force search. On average, a brute force attack must check 
half of the total runs, performing 2
255
 encryptions, to find 
the key. This 256 bits key length is enough for the 
symmetric ciphers to provide plentiful commercial 
security. 
 
The detection rate is the probability of detecting a 
malicious or foe node in MANET cluster which evaluates 
the detection performance of strict friendliness verification 
scheme. When a suspicious  transmitting node sends 
request to the receiver node,  such that it could persuade as 
a friendly node and avoid being detected during the strict 
friendly verification process, with  the probability of 
replayed by wormholes (pwh), probability of  node’s key 
replay (pi) and  the probability of locally RTT replayed (pr) 
by neighbors.  Then, the probability of detection of 
replayed by wormholes is (1-pwh), the probability of 
detection of node’s key replay is (1-pi) and the probability 
of detection of locally RTT replayed (1-pr) in the strict 
friendliness verification. The probability of suspicious 
node detection by a friendly node is computed as: 
 
                   wh i r
P=(1-p )*(1-p )*(1-p )
                  
(11)   
        
 
When each detecting node having n detection keys, the 
detection rate or probability (Pdr) of a suspicious node 
being detected by a kind friendly detecting node can be 
computed as: 
             
n n
dr wh i rP =1-(1-p )=1-{1-(1-p )*(1-p )*(1-p )}  
                                                       
(12)          
 
 
 
 
     Figure 3: Detection Rate Analysis 
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 This implies that unless the detection probability increases, 
the detection rate cannot be increased. A kind friendly 
detecting node can significantly increase the detection rate 
using higher number of symmetric keys. Figure 3 shows 
that the transmitter detection rate increases with the higher 
number of Symmetric keys changing at receiver because it 
increases the robustness against replay attacks.  
 
4.  Multiple Target’s PL&T Algorithm 
 
 Cluster head deploy SFV based authentication for each 
node by the exchange of ToD and ToA information to 
compute the Euclidean distance as well as RTT and 
symmetric keys a explained in section 4. If the node is 
not authenticated then it is malicious target node, 
otherwise strict friendly node.    
 
 When the cluster head detects the malicious target Bi 
then it assigns any two friendly (authenticated) nodes as 
references nodes Aj and Ck. These are friendly till they 
participate in PL&T operation. These are further re-used 
as reference only when these can cover other malicious 
targets within threshold radius by multiple beamforming 
simultaneously. The reference nodes Aj and Ck send RTS 
packet using sectored antenna scanning for the target 
node Bi. Once, these nodes get CTS from the target Bi 
then it is second reference node Ck and retrieves 
management packets from target Bi for ToA, ToD, DoA 
and data tracking. Otherwise, other friendly nodes are 
assigned by cluster head if target moves away from the 
range of the previous reference nodes.   
 
 When both reference nodes Aj and Ck   localize the fresh 
position of the target node Bi, then the tracking zone is 
formulated for Rapid PL&T whose radius ri is the ratio 
of the distance between reference nodes djk and the 
average distance davg= 0.5*(dji+dki)  from reference nodes 
to the target node Bi. This tactics enable that the 
coverage of tracking zone is increased at the nearest 
location of target Bi from reference nodes Aj and Ck 
where the beam width is wider. Similarly, the coverage 
of tracking zone is decreased at the furthest location of 
target Bi from reference nodes where the beam width is 
narrower.  
 
 Once the tracking zone is formed then the reference 
nodes Aj and Ck focus their sectored beam over the 
tracking zone of the target Bi by dynamic ranging to 
optimize the tracking dynamics and performance. 
Furthermore, the tracking zone can be tangentially 
shifted and changed as per target’s directional motion.  
In addition, reference nodes and their sectored beam can 
be changed and switched for adjusting the tracking zone.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Multiple Targets PL&T using Four Sectored Antenna  
 
 
All  above  steps  are  repeated  by  other sectored antennas  
{ Txj ….Txj+n-1  , Txk ….Txk+n-1} of both reference nodes to 
form different tracking zones over different neighboring 
targets simultaneously using the spatial reuse of  four 
sectored antennas.   
 
Mathematically, the set of positions P
k
j,i of different i
 
targets by a node  deploying k different sectored antenna 
beams along with j reference nodes are computed as 
below.  The targets are assumed to be moving at velocity 
v
k
i in the direction  ˇ
k
j,i with Euclidean distance D
k
j,i at 
time Δtkj,i respectively as shown in Figure 4. 
 
                   
i,k=4;j 4
k
i,j
i,j,k=1
P

   
(13) 
 
                    
i,k=4;j 4
k k k
i j,i j,i
i,j,k=1
v (θˇ )Δt

    (14)
 
                                                              
(14)                                                   
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The efficiency of Rapid PL&T is evaluated over 100 
different random experiments of PL&T observations by 
changing the position of tracking nodes and tracking zone 
regarding the target. The result is found that the average 
efficiency of Rapid PL&T is 96% as shown in Figure 5. 
Therefore, the proposed Rapid PL&T is highly efficient 
and faster PL&T algorithm.  
i,k=4;j 4
k k k k
i j,i j,i j,i j,i j,i
i,j,k=1
v *(cos(θ )xˇ +(sinθ )yˇ )*Δt

  
 
Figure 5: Rapid PL&T using Sectored Array Antennas 
 
 
5.  Simulation & Performance Evaluation  
 
Multiple target’s PL&T is deployed in cluster size of 400 
X 400 sq. m. deploying 60 nodes with 250 m range in each 
cluster with similar mobility characteristics deploying 
iteratively Rapid PL&T at each sector of multiple sectored 
antennas with the friendly nodes. This enables that each 
reference node can localize and track four targets 
simultaneously at its different sectored beams with other 
friendly reference nodes. Simulation shows that iterative 
deployment of Rapid PL&T at four different sectored 
antennas of a reference node provides average PL&T 
efficiency of 96%, 85%, 69% and 60% for four different 
targets over 100 different random experiments taken at the 
interval of 5 seconds in 500 seconds by changing the 
position of targets and the corresponding tracking zone as 
shown in Figure 6. 
         
 
  
Figure 6: Multiple PL&T using Four Sectored Antennas 
  
Multiple Targets PL&T is deployed with 4 multiple 
sectored antennas and switching overhead is simulated 
regarding velocity of target nodes in 50 different 
experiments in Figure 7-8. Simulation results show that 
the switching overhead is higher at higher velocity of the 
targets because the reference nodes are rapidly switched in 
out of range scenario. The overhead is higher even at 
speed of 20 m/s because one node is localizing and 
tracking four random target nodes with other four 
reference making four different pairs by switching beams 
as per availability and requirement. This concurs that the 
low relative speed bound of a single node using four 
consecutive adaptive beams increased the switching 
overhead in Multiple Targets PL&T. 
  
It is observed that the first target is easily detected and 
tracked with another reference node switching the sectored 
beam and later reference node is switched at 11
th
 and 25
th
 
experiments. Similarly, second target is detected and 
tracked with another reference node switching remaining 
three sectors and later reference node is switched at 18
th
 
experiment. Third target is also detected and tracked with 
other reference node and switching desired sector beam 
from two sectors and later reference node is switched at 
43
th
 experiment. Fourth target took long overhead at the 
initial experiment to scan the desired reference node to 
detect and track using the last sector and later changed 
reference node at 35
th
 experiment. The beam switching is 
deployed as soon as sectored beams are available as per 
requirement of reference nodes and targets.   
 
 
Figure 7:  Switching Overhead of Multiple Targets PL&T 
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Figure 8: Velocity of Multiple Targets PL&T 
 
Multiple Target’s Trajectory and their PL&T estimation 
are illustrated in Figure 9 for four different target nodes 
moving along parallel paths.  The average errors in PL&T 
estimation of four different targets trajectory are found to 
be 1.73 m, 2.13 m, 2.22 m and 2.33 m respectively. In 
addition, the received signal energy by a receiving target 
node is analyzed by varying different number of sectored 
beams at transmitting node as illustrated in Figure 10. The 
simulation results show that the received energy decreases 
with increasing number of the sectored beams because of 
the inter signal interference between sectored beams.  
 
 
Figure 9: Multiple Targets Trajectory PL&T 
 
Friendliness between reference nodes is essential for 
developing the narrow zones, adaptive beam forming and 
tracking of the multiple malicious nodes using 4 sectored 
antennas. Figure 11 depicts the maintenance of 
friendliness by 4 sectored beams of a reference node with 
another 4 different reference nodes. The first three friendly 
nodes are authenticated using different beams from sector-
1,sector-2, sector-3 easily but the fourth node need  at least  
 
20 seconds to scan and authenticate new friendly nodes as 
three friendly nodes already in use by other sectored 
beams. Furthermore, when the existing reference node 
does not maintain friendliness for PL&T then another 
friendly node is authenticated and use for PL&T. The true 
friendliness is maintained only when the node is 
authenticated based on SFV. The friendliness 
authentication overhead depends upon the time period 
between two latest failures in maintaining friendliness as 
illustrated in Figure 11. The scanning and authentication 
overhead is at least 20 seconds for a single friendliness 
failure after some time interval and at least 30 seconds for 
any two consecutive friendliness failures. 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Received Signal Energy at Different Sectored Beams  
 
 
 
Figure 11: Maintaining Friendly Reference Nodes during PL&T  
.  
6. Conclusion 
  
Multiple targets’ PL&T integrated with strict friendly 
verification significantly increase the PL&T detection rate 
by increasing the number of symmetric keys as well as 
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 rapid zone finding for multiple malicious nodes. It is found 
that the low relative speed bound of any single node using 
four consecutive adaptive beams increased the switching 
overhead in multiple targets’ PL&T. The beam switching 
is deployed as soon as sectored beams are available as per 
requirement of reference nodes and targets. In addition, the 
received energy decreases with increasing number of the 
sectored beams because of the inter signal interference 
between sectored beams. Furthermore, strict friendly 
authentication overhead depends upon the time period 
between two latest failures in maintaining friendliness. 
Future research will concentrate on the secured location 
aware multimedia streaming with QoS optimization. 
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